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Introduction
One-third of the world’s population lives in countries that 
have moved away from liberal democracy (Lührmann et al., 
2019). Hence, democracy as a form of government is under 
stress. As scholars consider political culture a force that facil-
itates democracy’s persistence (Almond and Verba, 1963), it 
is little wonder that the unexpected fragility of self-govern-
ance has fuelled scholarly interest in the regime preferences 
of ordinary citizens. In this vein, proponents of the demo-
cratic deconsolidation hypothesis have challenged the long-
held idea that, despite widespread dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy, citizens of consolidated democra-
cies continue to support the abstract principles of the demo-
cratic society they live in (Norris, 2011). Specifically, the 
deconsolidation hypothesis posits that an increasing share of 
citizens—in particular the most recent birth cohorts—has 
turned away from liberal democracy and started pondering 
non-democratic forms of government (Foa and Mounk, 
2017; Mounk, 2018). However, scholars have questioned the 
robustness and generalizability of the evidence in support of 
democratic deconsolidation (Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017; 
Zilinsky, 2019). Consequently, it is an unresolved empirical 
question whether and to what extent citizens of consolidated 
democracies still back liberal democracy and its underlying 
principles.
This study contributes to assessing the attitudinal foun-
dations of liberal democracies by employing suitable ana-
lytical strategies and leveraging data that allows for a more 
comprehensive assessment of the democratic deconsolida-
tion hypothesis than previous research. One limitation of 
previous research concerns the lack of fit between measures 
and concepts. While most authors discuss challenges to lib-
eral democracy (e.g. Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Mounk, 
2018), most empirical studies focus on attitudes toward 
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democracy per se, without distinguishing its subtypes (e.g. 
Foa and Mounk, 2017; Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017; Zilinsky, 
2019). Yet, direct measures referencing ‘democracy’ with-
out further qualification are subject to considerable social 
desirability biases, which may inflate actual levels of sup-
port (Denemark, Mattes et al., 2016; Schedler and Sarsfield, 
2007). Moreover, direct measures of democratic support 
may overshadow attitudinal shifts under the surface. 
Specifically, ‘democracy’ might continue to enjoy citizen 
support when queried in generic terms, but citizens might 
nonetheless depart from a liberal conception of democracy 
and adopt more authoritarian or populist notions of self-
governance. Because scholars often assume shifts in public 
sentiment toward illiberal democracy (e.g. Mounk, 2018; 
Runciman, 2018) but lack the data to test this notion, this 
study complements the analysis of direct measures of dem-
ocratic support by an analysis of attitudes toward constitu-
tive elements of the liberal variant of self-governance.
To examine generational and other intertemporal propo-
sitions in theories on democratic deconsolidation, standard 
practice in previous research is to compare mean levels of 
attitudes at different points in time or across age groups 
(e.g. Foa and Mounk, 2017; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; 
Voeten, 2017). Yet, such an approach cannot reliably dis-
cern life-cycle, generational, and period-specific dynamics, 
although identifying the nature of attitude dynamics pro-
vides valuable analytical insights (e.g. Grasso, 2014; 
Holford, 1991; Mason et al., 1973). To begin with, mortal-
ity may affect the marginal distribution of attitudes in soci-
ety if attitudes are not spread evenly across age groups. 
Such age-related differences may reflect life-cycle and 
cohort effects, both of which are hard to disentangle in a 
cross-sectional perspective. Separating these temporal 
effects is important because cohort differences often reflect 
lasting formative experiences and thus foreshadow chang-
ing levels of attitude distribution in the wake of genera-
tional replacement. If lower democratic support among the 
young reflects generational disparities, societal levels of 
support for democracy are set to decline with the passing of 
time. Period effects, in contrast, reflect up- or downward 
movements of attitude levels from one point in time to 
another, while controlling for the other temporal mecha-
nisms, and may result from all kinds of short-term influ-
ences in a given period. Altogether, using adequate 
statistical techniques to disentangle cohort, period, and age 
effects (e.g. Grasso, 2014; Mason et al., 1973) helps to bet-
ter understand whether the observed attitude distributions 
are a worrisome sign of the current and future declining 
levels of democratic support in consolidated democracies.
We analyzed support for democracy with a novel compi-
lation of probability-based survey datasets from Germany, 
covering the period from 1982 to 2018. Germany is an 
intriguing case for the study of democratic support. First, it 
offers long-term survey data containing an original battery 
of democracy-related questions that have not previously 
been examined with regard to the democratic deconsolida-
tion hypothesis (but see Westle, 2015). Second, the country 
offers the unique context of two civic cultures within one 
nation state (Campbell, 2004). On the one hand, the country 
is currently considered exemplary of a vibrant and healthy 
liberal democracy, with some pundits and scholars attribut-
ing Germany the role of ‘leader of the free world’ (e.g. 
Franke, 2019). On the other hand, the depiction of unwa-
vering support for liberal democracy may be driven by 
impressions from the politically more stable Western part 
of the country. After the reunification, East Germany, in 
contrast, was subject to a combination of trends scholars 
identified as potentially leading to democratic deconsolida-
tion, thereby making East Germany a likely case of declin-
ing democratic support in a consolidated democracy.
Altogether, we employed statistical methods that 
allowed us to disentangle the underlying temporal effects 
of democratic deconsolidation previous research has sug-
gested. To minimize the risk of overlooking meaningful 
signs of democratic fatigue, we inspected a broad set of 
democracy-related indicators from a region in which demo-
cratic support is likely to have eroded. Despite these meas-
ures to lower the burden of finding evidence in support of 
the democratic deconsolidation hypothesis, the empirical 
evidence was characterized by stability rather than decline. 
This suggests that support for self-governance and for the 
underlying principles of liberal democracy remains as 
strong today in both parts of Germany as it has been among 
previous generations and at previous points in time.
Theories of social decline and 
Germany’s two trajectories
Scholars have suggested multiple mechanisms as causes for 
citizens turning their backs on liberal democracy. To begin 
with, socio-economic transformations toward automation 
and globalization are argued to spark resistance to the pre-
vailing order of governing, particularly among the adversely 
affected (e.g. Ballard-Rosa et al., 2018). Political–economic 
approaches (Streeck, 2016) posit that globalized capitalism 
forestalls basic psychological needs for autonomy and 
stimulates authoritarian tendencies by undermining the 
political agency of the nation-state (Fukuyama, 2018; Ryan 
and Deci, 2017). Information-theory approaches point to 
the revolution in communication technologies that may 
erode confidence in established hierarchies, including dem-
ocratic institutions (Gurri, 2018). Other authors stress the 
potential of a cultural backlash (Mounk, 2018; Norris and 
Inglehart, 2019) in reaction to modernizing forces that may 
make citizens feel left behind and lacking recognition 
(Fukuyama, 2018; Mutz, 2018).
These trends should mostly occur in the form of period 
effects, undermining democratic support over time and uni-
formly across age groups. In addition, various authors sug-
gest that cohort disparities drive democratic consolidation 
Wuttke et al. 3
(Denemark, Mattes et al., 2016; Foa and Mounk, 2017; 
Norris, 2017; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Often, scholars 
identify the young generation as the vanguard of democratic 
deconsolidation (Denemark, Donovan et al., 2016; Foa and 
Mounk, 2017; Mounk, 2018), arguing that the young cohort 
has grown up in an age of insecurity (Inglehart, 2018) and 
has often been hit hardest by the economic crisis (Mounk, 
2018). Moreover, as recent cohorts are used to individual-
ized consumer products and highly responsive media tech-
nologies, they may perceive the democratic process as 
comparatively slow and unresponsive (Gurri, 2018; Mounk, 
2018; Runciman, 2018; Streeck, 2016). Hence, generational 
arguments play a prominent role in contemporary discus-
sions, and one line of research views the young as most sus-
ceptible to anti-democratic temptations.
Due to their general scope, the societal mechanisms driv-
ing period and cohort effects apply to all consolidated democ-
racies to a higher or lower degree, including both regions of 
Germany. Notably, period effects on democratic support in 
East Germany may be considered particularly likely because 
East Germans have lately experienced a combination of social 
transformations, potentially amplifying their adverse effects. 
Given the sharp decline of East Germany’s industry after the 
fall of the iron curtain and the persistently lower levels of 
various socio-economic indi cators in East Germany com-
pared with West Germany (BMWi, 2018), the economic 
downturn may have given East Germans reason to abandon 
support of democracy. Moreover, as West German experts 
filled many positions in East Germany’s political institutions 
after reunification, the perception of political co-dependence 
(Gergs et al., 1997) may have contributed to a growing feel-
ing of lacking recognition. Therefore, in addition to factors 
relevant to all consolidated democracies, East Germans expe-
rienced further setbacks and disappointments in the wake of 
the country’s reunification. Accordingly, it seems particularly 
likely to find evidence of decreasing levels of democratic sup-
port in this region of Germany.
This expectation receives additional support from the 
fact that, similar to Eastern European societies, large sec-
tions of East Germany’s population grew up in a totalitarian 
system that aimed to instill norms and values that do not 
square nicely with liberal democracy. Provided these 
socializing efforts were successful, East Germans may not 
have internalized democratic values as deeply as citizens in 
older democracies (Denemark, Mattes et al., 2016). This 
makes East Germans particularly susceptible to influences 
undermining these values. With respect to attitudinal differ-
ences between cohorts, however, the breakdown of societal 
institutions renders expectations more complex. Contrasting 
birth cohorts within the eastern region, in the wake of dem-
ocratic learning (Denemark, Mattes et al., 2016), younger 
East German cohorts may be more likely to have adopted 
democratic values than older East Germans who grew up 
under non-democratic regimes. Contrasting young cohorts 
across German regions, we see that some trends, such as 
new technologies (Gurri, 2018), affect all young cohorts in 
the same way. Yet, young East Germans were more 
adversely affected by the region’s economic and social 
challenges and may thus exhibit lower levels of democratic 
support than their young West German compatriots (BMWi, 
2018). Altogether, if any of the societal transformations 
discussed above have eroded citizen support for the system 
of government they live in, we should observe such effects 
among German citizens. Notwithstanding the more nuanced 
expectations regarding generational patterns, overall demo-
cratic deconsolidation should be particularly strong in East 
Germany for various reasons, such as its long non-demo-
cratic history and the social–structural transformation in 
recent decades.
Data and methods
To examine how support for the principles of liberal 
democracy has evolved in East and West Germany, we 
combined various probability-based surveys spanning the 
time period from 1990 to 2018 (East) and 1982 to 2018 
(West). Primarily, we relied on time-series data from the 
German General Social Survey (GESIS, 2019) and multi-
ple German election studies (see Online Appendix A for 
detailed information on data sources). In an attempt to 
account for sampling biases, we used socio-demographic 
weights. Table 1 lists the question wording of the indicators 
of democratic support. We used two direct indicators to tap 
into citizens’ evaluations of democracy per se. One indica-
tor measured the support for democracy as a system of gov-
erning, whereas the other captured satisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy. In addition, we included a set of 
indicators to measure support of constitutive principles of 
liberal democracy, such as the protection of individual 
rights and pluralism. To avoid arbitrary choices that might 
bias the results, we employed an inclusive approach and 
covered principles that not all scholars might consider key 
to liberal democracy. The items varied in difficulty. For 
example, some indicators are worded negatively to query 
agreement with anti-liberal notions, which may have 
induced acquiescence bias. However, as long as the differ-
ences in item difficulty between measurement instruments 
are stable over time, they will not affect the main results 
concerning stability and change in support of the principles 
of liberal democracy (see Online Appendix B for analyses 
on the factor structure and changes over time; see Online 
Appendix C for subgroup analyses).
To create a time series, we harmonized various data 
sources for the analysis, which comes with the caveat of 
inconsistencies in the measurement instrument over time. 
For instance, the surveys in the 1980s relied on a 6-point 
scale, whereas more recent surveys used odd-numbered 
scales. Previous research suggests that response behaviour 
is unlikely to be strongly affected by those types of instru-
ment changes (e.g. Dawes, 2008; Leung, 2011). Nonetheless, 
these inconsistencies may introduce noise into the distribu-
tion of attitudes over time. Therefore, when visualizing 
4 Research and Politics 
period effects, we applied smoothing techniques to separate 
trends from idiosyncratic fluctuations over time. In this 
vein, inconsistencies in the measurement instruments can 
only affect the estimates of interest if multiple changes 
across surveys bias the results in the same direction. Yet, 
having examined instrument changes suggests that such pat-
terns are unlikely (see Online Appendix D for detailed docu-
mentation). All variables were rescaled to a common scale 
from 0 to 1.
In order to empirically distinguish cohort and period 
effects, we employed generalized additive models (GAM, 
Grasso, 2014). This method enabled us to disentangle age, 
period, and cohort effects using a standard smoothing 
spline to estimate nonlinear cohort effects. We included age 
group and period terms as fixed effects, since we assumed 
that these effects would be constant across individuals:
Y AGEGROUP AGEGROUP
s YEAROF BIRTH
ik k ik ik
ik k i
= + +
+ ( ) + +
β β β
τ ε
0 1 21 2
k
Additionally, we included the survey years as fixed effects 
(for period effects) and age as a categorical variable (15–29, 
30–59, 60+). In order to assess cohort effects and period 
differences, we visualized predicted mean levels on the 
dependent variables according to the observed values 
approach (see Online Appendix F for regression tables).
Results
In the first step of the analysis, we focused on direct meas-
ures of democracy, irrespective of what respondents under-
stand by democracy. Figure 1 shows period effects (top 
row) and cohort effects (bottom row) on support for democ-
racy in principle and on satisfaction with the performance 
of democracy. Because life-cycle effects are mostly small 
or insignificant and not the focus of scholarly debates about 
changes in democratic support over time, these results are 
not reported in the main text (see Online Appendix D).
Starting with period effects, the upper left panel in 
Figure 1 shows some fluctuations in evaluations of regime 
performance, yet no clear trends. On a different level, satis-
faction with democracy underwent some changes in both 
West and East Germany. In West Germany, satisfaction 
declined in the wake of unification. In recent years, how-
ever, satisfaction with democracy slightly increased again 
in both regions. The evidence thus does not bolster the 
claim that satisfaction is steadily declining in Germany. In 
particular, it does not lend credence to the idea that East 
Germans are becoming increasingly critical of the function-
ing of democracy.
Turning to period effects on support for democracy as an 
idea, the upper right panel in Figure 1 shows some variation 
over time on a high level of support in both East and West 
Germany. Building on the idea that low satisfaction with 
Table 1. Items to measure democratic support.
Concept Question wording Survey years
Direct measures of support for democracy
Support for democratic 
regime principles
Irrespective of actual, existing democracies how 
much do you favour or disfavour the idea of 
democracy in principle?
’85/’86, ’89, ’92, ’93, ’95, ’96, ’98, ’02, 
’05, ’18
Satisfaction with democracy All in all, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with 
democracy as it currently exists in Germany?
’85/’86, ’88, ’89, ’91, ’92, ’93, ’98, ’00, ’02, 
’05, ’08, ’14, ’18
Support for liberal–democratic regime principles
Freedom of expression Everybody should have the right to express their 
opinion even though the majority has a different 
opinion.
’82, ’88, ’93, ’94, ’95, ’96, ’98, ’02, ’05, ’18
Prioritizing individual interests The interests of the entire population should 
always go before the particular interest of the 
single individual. [R]
’82, ’88, ’93, ’95, ’96, ’18
Pluralist differences of parties It is not the job of the political opposition to 
criticize the government but to support the 
government in doing its work. [R]
’82, ’88, ’93, ’95, ’96, ’18
Pluralist differences of 
interest groups
The conflicts between the various interest groups 
in our society and their demands to government 
hurt the general welfare. [R]
’82, ’88, ’93, ’94, ’95, ’96, ’18
Multi-party competition Each democratic party should, in principle have the 
chance to get into government.
’82, ’88, ’93, ’95, ’96, ’98, ’02, ’18
Political opposition A viable democracy is unthinkable without political 
opposition.
’82, ’88, ’93, ’94, ’95, ’96, ’98, ’02, ’05, ’18
Note: [R] indicates a reverse-coded item. Question wordings from the 2018 ALLBUS. Question wording may differ in other surveys, see Online 
Appendices D, E.
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the performance of a regime may erode support for the 
principles underlying that regime (e.g. Westle, 2015), we 
suppose that these fluctuations reflect citizen responses to 
changing levels of satisfaction with the performance of the 
democratic regime. It is also conceivable that the small, 
trendless fluctuations depicted in Figure 1 and elsewhere 
reflect measurement and sampling inconsistencies across 
surveys. Notwithstanding these temporary fluctuations, 
however, German citizens remained steadfast supporters of 
the democratic idea. The most recent survey reveals almost 
universal acceptance of democracy, thus showing no sign 
of any eroding support for democracy as an idea.
While the analysis of period effects did not yield evi-
dence supporting the tenet of democratic erosion, we might 
have found generational effects that foreshadowed a decline 
of democratic support in the wake of generational replace-
ment. Yet, while some intergenerational differences were 
visible, the results did not indicate fading democratic 
support among younger generations (see bottom panels in 
Figure 1). Examining both regions separately, we observed 
stable and strong support for the idea of democracy in West 
Germany, regardless of when a citizen was born. We found 
a slight decrease in regime evaluations among West German 
cohorts that were raised before 1990. This trend did not 
continue after unification. If anything, the most recent 
cohorts exhibited a somewhat higher level of satisfaction 
with democracy. Altogether, there was thus no evidence for 
democratic fatigue among the young generation in West 
Germany.
It is even more striking—contrasting the democratic 
deconsolidation hypothesis—that both indicators of demo-
cratic support grew even stronger in East Germany across 
post-reunification generations, so that the youngest cohorts 
appear the most fervent adherents of democratic self-gov-
ernance. For instance, satisfaction with democracy increased 
from an average predicted level of .48 [.45–.52, 95% CI] 
among those who came of age in 1975 to an average level of 
0.64 [.53–.74] for cohorts who came of age in 2016. Hence, 
Figure 1. Predicted levels of support of democracy using direct measures.
Note: Shown are the predicted mean values of period and cohort effects derived from GAM analyses using an observed value approach with simul-
taneous confidence intervals (Simpson, 2018). For the cohort plots, smoothing splines over the yearly predictions are shown in the foreground.
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young Germans particularly in the eastern part of the coun-
try are more satisfied with and convinced of democracy than 
previous cohorts. This suggests that societal levels of demo-
cratic support are likely to further increase rather than 
decline in the wake of generational replacement.
Thus far, the results on direct measures of support for 
democracy have not lent credence to the democratic 
deconsolidation hypothesis. Moreover, the data suggest 
that the East–West gap in democratic support has nar-
rowed considerably, refuting expectations that East 
Germany might be the forerunner of democratic decon-
solidation. However, it remains an open question whether 
citizens merely report ‘support of democracy’ when asked 
in a survey but cease to endorse the core principles that 
constitute this system of government, particularly democ-
racy’s liberal variant. To examine whether the results on 
direct measures of democratic support hide an erosion of 
support for liberal core components, figures 2–4 show the 
development of public support for several core principles 
of liberal democracy.
Starting with the idea that liberal democracies respond to 
the inherent tension between individual and collective inter-
ests by prioritizing the dignity of the individual citizen, 
Figure 2 displays two indicators of support for individual 
rights. Although the levels of support differ markedly 
between both indicators, period effects do not consistently 
suggest eroding individualist orientations (top row). Whereas 
the priority of individual over collective interests was subject 
to a slight decline in past years, support for freedom of 
expression has grown stronger in recent survey years from an 
already high level. Considering cohort effects, both individu-
alist notions have become more popular among recent birth 
cohorts, particularly in East Germany. The generational 
increase thus suggests that society as a whole is headed 
toward a stronger emphasis on individualist values instead of 
turning away from these liberal–democratic principles.
Figure 2. Predicted levels of support for individualistic notions of liberal democracy.
Note: Shown are the predicted mean values of period and cohort effects derived from GAM analyses using an observed value approach with simul-
taneous confidence intervals (Simpson, 2018). For the cohort plots, smoothing splines over the yearly predictions are shown in the foreground.
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The remaining indicators concern the acceptance of plu-
ralism (Figure 3) and support of a multi-party system and 
political opposition (Figure 4). The examination of period 
effects in both figures suggests attitudinal stability rather 
than an erosion of democratic values. Absolute levels of 
support vary across indicators, and some attitudes such as 
support for the pluralist differences of interest groups vary 
slightly across the survey waves. Overall, German citizens 
back the principles of pluralism and mutual forbearance as 
strongly today as they did at previous points in time.
Likewise, generational disparities on these indicators do 
not suggest that we are on a steady path to democratic ero-
sion. Younger cohorts have grown somewhat more scepti-
cal of multi-party competition, but, compared with previous 
generations, exhibit an increasing acceptance of the plural-
ist notion that conflicts between interests do not necessarily 
damage societal welfare. Altogether, there is no consistent 
pattern of generational trends in one direction or the other, 
again not lending much support to the democratic decon-
solidation hypothesis.
Conclusion
Whether citizens are turning their backs on democracy is an 
unresolved academic question with relevance beyond aca-
demic discourse. In the light of growing concerns among 
pundits and scholars about eroding democratic support and 
because previous studies yielded mixed results on this 
issue, this study examined the development of citizens’ atti-
tudes toward democracy in a setting and with measures that 
should lower the difficulty of finding support for demo-
cratic deconsolidation. Yet, the main findings of this study 
point to stability rather than decline in citizen support for 
democracy. Examining the attitudes of West and East 
Germans from 1982 to 2018, we did not find strong evi-
dence for declining democratic support in terms of period 
Figure 3. Predicted levels of support for pluralist notions of liberal democracy.
Note: Shown are the predicted mean values of period and cohorts effects derived from GAM analyses using an observed value approach with simul-
taneous confidence intervals (Simpson, 2018). For the cohort plots, smoothing splines over the yearly predictions are shown in the foreground.
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or generational effects. Notably, having disentangled age, 
cohort, and period effects, we can be reasonably confident 
that the stability in aggregate attitude levels does not hide 
countervailing temporal effects offsetting each other. What 
is more, even when broadening the scope beyond direct 
measures of democratic support that are prone to various 
conceptual and methodological limitations, more specific 
indicators of support for liberal–democratic core norms did 
not exhibit a consistent pattern of decline either. Consider-
ing that statistical power is sufficient to detect even small 
changes, thanks to the aggregation of multiple surveys, 
these findings are particularly noteworthy. All things con-
sidered, the overall picture thus suggests stability in the 
attitudinal foundations of liberal democracy in Germany. 
Democratic support has not undergone a substantial decline 
even in East Germany, where deconsolidation was consid-
ered most likely. This suggests that political turmoil and the 
rising support for political movements with questionable 
stances toward liberal democracy, such as populist parties, 
do not necessarily go hand in hand with an erosion of dem-
ocratic support in a narrow or broader conceptualization.
When interpreting these results, we should keep data 
limitations in mind. For instance, Germany witnessed sub-
stantial interregional mobility after reunification, but most 
surveys only query a respondent’s current place of resi-
dence. We are thus not able to identify individuals who 
have moved only recently and who have not experienced 
local conditions for long. This, in turn, biases the results 
toward convergence between the regions and limits our 
ability to identify the East German biographies we consid-
ered would be the most likely cases of democratic decon-
solidation. Similarly, we cannot preclude that changing 
sampling biases or differential item functioning might have 
distorted the analyzed survey data.
Most importantly, these findings do not suggest that 
democracy is safe in Germany or in other countries in which 
liberal variants of self-governance have taken root. Although 
this study broadened the scope beyond generic measures of 
Figure 4. Predicted levels of support for multi-party notions of liberal democracy.
Note: Shown are the predicted mean values of period and cohort effects derived from GAM analyses using an observed value approach with simul-
taneous confidence intervals (Simpson, 2018). For the cohort plots, smoothing splines over the yearly predictions are shown in the foreground.
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democracy, it nonetheless considered only a subset of rele-
vant attitudes toward liberal democracy. Moreover, citizen 
attitudes toward democracy are but one indicator of a 
healthy democracy. For instance, a stable democracy 
requires citizens to not only support this system of govern-
ment but also translate these convictions into political action 
when political entrepreneurs attempt to test it. While this 
study thus does not represent a comprehensive test of demo-
cratic deconsolidation, it is another piece of the puzzle to 
help assess and understand the current state of democracy.
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